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which could apply in these non-estoppel situations, the court has only
perpetuated uncertainty in this area of commercial transactions and
postponed for a later case a resolution of issues which must be made.
If the Texas Supreme Court decides to ignore the statutory man-
date-and is allowed to do so-it appears that banks will be able to
induce corporations to enter ultra vires transactions and to enforce
the terms of the contracts only if the corporation receives a benefit
from the transaction. However, since courts have been rather lenient
in finding "substantial benefits," until an expressly prohibitive statute
similar to section 42 of the model act" is enacted in Texas or until the
courts declare that corporate loans to its officers are against public pol-
icy, the banks will still be relatively free to continue the practice of
requiring such loans.
Steven C. Salch
Constitutionality of the Alcohol Blood Test
Schmerber was involved in an automobile accident when the car he
was driving struck a tree. He was observed by a police officer at the
scene of the accident as he was being placed in the ambulance. At
the hospital the officer placed Schmerber under arrest. Then, without
having obtained a search warrant, the officer asked him to agree to a
blood test. He initially consented but later objected on advice of coun-
sel. Nevertheless the blood sample was taken by a hospital physician,
the results of the test being admitted into evidence at trial. Schmer-
ber was convicted of driving while intoxicated. The highest state court
affirmed the conviction,' and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Held, affirmed: The taking of a blood sample upon probable cause,
over the defendant's objection based on reliance of counsel's advice, is
not a denial of due process of law, of the privilege against self-in-
crimination, of the privilege against unreasonable search and seizure,
or of the right to counsel. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757
(1966).
66 See note 36 supra.
' CALIFORNIA VEHICLE CODE ANN. § 23102 (a) (1959) provides in pertinent part, "It is
unlawful for any person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor . . . to drive any
vehicle on any highway .. ." The offense is a misdemeanor.
'The judgment of the appellate department of the California superior court was the
judgment of the highest court of the state since certification to the California district court
of appeals was denied.
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I. CONSTITUTIONAL CRITERIA FOR ADMISSIBILITY
OF PHYSICAL EVIDENCE
A. Federal Standards
The Supreme Court first considered the constitutionality of the al-
cohol blood test in Breithaupt v. Abram,' holding that the taking of
blood against the will of an individual did not violate due process of
law. The defendant had been involved in an automobile accident, and
while he was unconscious at the hospital, the blood sample had been
withdrawn. In affirming his conviction for involuntary manslaughter,
the Court balanced the interests of society against individual rights
in the following language:
As against the right of the individual that his person be held inviolable,
even as against so small an intrusion as is involved in applying a blood
test of the kind to which millions of Americans submit as a matter of
course nearly every day, must be set the interests of society in the scien-
tific determination of intoxication, one of the great causes of mortal
hazards on the road . . . . Furthermore, since our criminal law is to no
small extent justified by the assumption of deterrence, the individual's
right to immunity . . . is far outweighed by the value of [the test's]
deterrent effect .... 4
In deciding the due process issue, the Court accepted the "shock the
conscience" test laid down in Rochin v. California,' a case concerned
with the forcible use of a stomach pump to extract narcotic pills from
the stomach of the suspect. The Rochin Court had concluded that
"the course of the proceedings by agents of the government to obtain
evidence was bound to offend even hardened sensibilities."' The con-
viction had been set aside because use of the stomach pump "shocked
the conscience" and was "brutal" and "offensive." But in Breithaupt
the Court refused to attach these labels to the taking of blood.
The Court in Breithaupt did not consider whether the blood test
violated the privilege against self-incrimination, since the fifth amend-
ment had not yet been absorbed into the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment and thus made applicable to the states.' The
a352 U.S. 432 (1957).
4 1d. at 439.
5 342 U.S. 165 (1952). In laying down the test the Court stated:
Regard for the requirements of the Due Process Clause inescapably imposes
upon this Court an exercise of judgment upon the whole course of the pro-
ceedings (resulting in a conviction) in order to ascertain whether they offend
the canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of
English-speaking people toward those charged with heinous offenses. Id. at 169.
e342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
On the subject of incorporation see Black's dissenting opinion in Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46, 92 (1947). Contra, Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the
Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949). See also Note, 19
Sw. L.J. 632 (1965).
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NOTES
contention that use of an individual's body or physical actions as
evidence, i.e., the use of physical evidence,' is a violation of the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination has, for the most part,
been rejected in federal courts' due to the Supreme Court's holding in
Holt v. United States." In that case the accused, prior to trial and over
his protest, had put on a blouse left by the criminal. Evidence of this
act and the fact that the blouse fitted him had resulted in his convic-
tion. Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court, stated, "the prohibi-
tion of the fifth amendment against compelling a man to give evidence
against himself is limited to the use of physical or moral compulsion
to extort communications from him and not an exclusion of his body
as evidence when it is material."" The distinction which the courts
have drawn in admitting into evidence fingerprints, photographs,
and identifying characteristics is that they do not call upon the ac-
cused as a witness, i.e., upon his testimonial capacity. What is ob-
tained from the accused is not testimony about his body but evidence
from his body.'2
The Court in Breithaupt did not rule on the constitutionality of the
blood test in light of the fourth amendment privilege against un-
reasonable search and seizure. The Court applied the rule laid down in
Wolf v. Colorado" that in a prosecution in a state court for a state
crime, the fourteenth amendment does not forbid the admission of
evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure. In cases deal-
ing with bodily invasions, the fourth amendment privilege against
unreasonable search and seizure has been a neglected defense. The
issue of the constitutionality of searches and seizures involving houses,
papers, and effects has received wide treatment by the Court.4 But
these cases are not sufficiently on point in the case of bodily invasion.
Search of the person of an accused without a search warrant when
the accused is legally arrested may be permitted" for two reasons:
' "Physical evidence" as the term will be used in this Note, will refer to organic evidence
extracted from within or taken from the surface of the suspect's body.
'See, e.g., Robertson v. United States, 282 F.2d 648 (6th Cit. 1960) (standing for pur-
pose of identification); Hartzell v. United States, 72 F.2d 569 (sth Cit. 1934) (signature);
United States v. Kelley, 55 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1932) (fingerprinting); Neely v. United
States, 2 F.2d 849 (4th Cir. 1924) (removal of coat to show arm); United States v.
Nesmith, 121 F. Supp. 758 (D.D.C. 1954) (urine specimen); United States v. Sorrentino,
78 F. Supp. 425 (D. Pa. 1948) (standing for purpose of identification).
"218 U.S. 245 (1910).
11Id. at 245. (Emphasis added.)
"2 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2265, at 386 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
1"338 U.S. 25 (1949).
14 See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Essgee Co. v. United States,
262 U.S. 151 (1923); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); Trupiano v. United
States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948); Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339 (1958); Henry v.
United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
"See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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first, there may be the danger of concealed weapons, and, second, there
may be a danger of the destruction of evidence under the direct con-
trol of the accused.1" Further, it is recognized that once a search of the
arrested person is permissible, it would be both impractical and un-
necessary to the enforcement of the fourth amendment's purpose to
attempt to confine the search to weapons or destructible evidence
alone. 7 However valid these considerations, the Court had not been
called upon to consider their applicability to intrusions beyond the
body surface prior to Schmerber.
B. Texas Standards
Texas courts have dealt only with the argument that use of a sus-
pect's body in evidence is self-incriminatory. The development of
Texas case law was, until 1956, a continual vacillation concerning
Wigmore's theory of "testimonial compulsion"'8 (i.e., unless some at-
tempt is made to secure a communication-written, oral, or otherwise
-upon which reliance is to be placed as involving the accused's con-
sciousness of the facts and the operation of his mind in expressing it,
the demand made on him is not testimonial).
The trend was originally in favor of the liberal use of physical evi-
dence with the admission of compulsory fingerprints, 9 the placement
of feet in tracks left by the criminal," and the use of an enema to
dislodge stolen rings." Apodaca v. State," however, reversed the trend.
The defendant, suspected of being intoxicated, was forced to walk a
straight line, to make sudden turns, to hold out his hand and try to
touch his nose, and to furnish a urine specimen. The court held that
"6Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339
U.S. 56, 68 (1950) (dissenting opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
7 People v. Chiagles, 237 N.Y. 193, 197, 142 N.E. 583, 584 (1923).
58g WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2265, at 386-87 (McNaughton rev. 1961):
If an accused were to refuse to be removed from the jail to the courtroom for
trial, claiming he was privileged not to expose his features for identification,
it is not difficult to conceive the judicial reception which would be given to
such a claim. And yet no less a claim is the logical consequence of the argu-
ment that has been frequently presented and occasionally sanctioned in apply-
ing the privilege to proof of bodily features of the accused.
The limit of the privilege should be plain. From the general principle it re-
sults that an inspection of the bodily features by the tribunal or witnesses
does not violate the privilege. . . . That he may in such cases be required to
take off his shoes or roll up his sleeve is immaterial unless all bodily actions
are synonymous with testimonial utterance. . . . Not compulsion alone is the
component idea of the privilege, but testimonial compulsion. Moreover, a prac-
tical consideration applies to this class of evidence. When the person's body,
its marks and traits, itself is an issue, there is ordinarily no other or better
evidence available for the prosecutor.
"McGarry v. State, 82 Tex. Crim. 597, 200 S.W. 527 (1918).
'0 Chase v. State, 97 Tex. Crim. 349, 261 S.W. 574 (1924).
2Ash v. State, 139 Tex. Crim. 420, 141 S.W.2d 341 (1940).
12140 Tex. Crim. 593, 146 S.W.2d 381 (1941).
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the actions violated his privilege against self-incrimination and re-
versed the conviction for driving while intoxicated. Gradually the
court began to whittle away at the strong lines it had drawn in Apo-
daca. Motion pictures of the defendant driving while intoxicated,2'
scrapings under fingernails,' results of a paraffin test to determine
nitrate contents on the hand of the suspect, 5 and speech for identifi-
cation" were admitted and held not to violate the self-incrimination
privilege. In Jones v. State"7 the court stated that the proper distinc-
tion to be made in cases involving the use of the body in evidence
was that the defendant could not be required to "perform acts
which might be used to support opinions of his condition,"2 though
compulsion might be used "for the purpose of obtaining proof of ex-
isting facts."2
Since the percentage of alcohol in a person's blood is as much a
fact in existence as the size and shape of his feet or the type of finger-
prints he makes, a compulsory chemical intoxication test would not
seem to violate the self-incrimination privilege of the Texas Consti-
tution.'" But in Trammel v. State"' the Texas Court of Criminal Ap-
peals ruled against the admissibility of blood test results obtained
without consent. After being injured in an accident, the defendant
was taken to a hospital. A blood specimen was taken from his arm,
and there was no evidence that the defendant was conscious at the
time. At the trial, the defendant objected to the introduction of the
blood test results on the ground that the state had failed to prove that
the sample was taken with his consent. On appeal, the conviction was
reversed, and the court stated: "The state having failed to show that
the specimen was taken with the consent of the appellant, the testi-
mony of ... [the expert witness] was not admissible." ' The Texas
"
3 Housewright v. State, 154 Tex. Crim. 101, 225 S.W.2d 417 (1950).
'Coleman v. State, 151 Tex. Crim. 582, 209 S.W.2d 925 (1948).
"SHenson v. State, 159 Tex. Crim. 647, 266 S.W.2d 864 (1954).
2
sJohnson v. State, 318 S.W.2d 76 (1958).
17 159 Tex. Crim. 29, 261 S.W.2d 161 (1952), cert. denied, 246 U.S. 830 (1953).
28 Id. at 163. (Emphasis added.).
2
1Id. at 163.
"OTEXAS CONST. art. 1, § 10. "In all criminal prosecutions the accused . .. shall not be
compelled to give evidence against himself ....
as 287 S.W.2d 487 (Tex. Crim. App. 1956). But see, Hartman v. Harder, 322 S.W.2d
555 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
32 287 S.W.2d 487, 4&8 (1956). In Texas evidence of a motorist's refusal to consent to
a blood test is not admissible against him. See, e.g., Cardwell v. State, 156 Tex. Crim. 457,
243 S.W.2d 702 (1951). In Trammel, the Court quoted from Brown v. State, 240' S.W.2d
310 (1951), which held that when consent is given by the defendant, admission of the
blood test results would violate neither the Texas Constitution nor the federal constitution.
The issue in Brown, however, was whether the blood sample on which the analysis was per-
formed was the same sample the defendant had given. In the absence of proof by the state




Court of Criminal Appeals, then, took a more protective position con-
cerning alcohol blood tests than did the Supreme Court in Breithaupt
one year later.
II. THE SCHMERBER RATIONALE
The four constitutional violations alleged in Schmerber were viola-
tion of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, violation
of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, violation
of the fourth amendment privilege against unreasonable search and
seizure, and violation of the sixth amendment right to counsel. Only
two were dwelt upon at length by the Court. The due process argu-
ment was dismissed by applying the Rochin "shock the conscience"
test and affirming Breithaupt's rationale that there was nothing brutal
or offensive about the blood test. The right to counsel argument, pred-
icated on the fact that counsel's advice had been ignored by the police,
was rejected on the grounds that Schmerber had no privilege to be free
of the blood test, and therefore no greater right to assert the privilege
because erroneously advised to do so by counsel."'
As a result of Malloy v. Hogan' the Court was faced with decid-
ing the constitutionality of the blood test in light of the fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination. In order to conclude that
admitting the "guilty blood" of a person into evidence is not self-
incrimination, the Court first had to define what constituted self-
incrimination. While denying that it was adopting Wigmore's theory
of "testimonial compulsion,"' the Court stated that the privilege pro-
tects an accused only from being compelled to testify against himself
or otherwise provide the state with evidence of a testimonial or com-
municative nature." The Court then qualified its rather broad state-
" It is interesting to speculate what the Court would have ruled on the right to counsel
argument fiad Schmerber not been advised by counsel previous to the taking of the blood
sample. The recent decision of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) defined very strict
limits within which the police may take oral statements of a defendant in the absence of
counsel. See note 46 infra. However, the taking of a blood sample does not involve oral
testimony; therefore, the Miranda rules are not applicable. The question of when the right
to counsel attaches in situations not involving oral statements by the defendant remains to
be answered. An answer appears to be forthcoming. The Court has recently granted certiorari
in a case involving the absence of counsel's advice at the time the defendant was placed in
a line-up. United States v. Wade, 358 F.2d 557 (1966), cert. granted, 35 U.S.L. WEEK
3109 (1966).
34 378 U.S. 1 (1964). The fifth amendment's exception from compulsory self-incrimina-
tion is protected by the fourteenth amendment against abridgement by the states.
aa See note 18 supra.
" A dissent suggests that the report of the blood test was "testimonial" or "communica-
tive" because the test was performed in order to obtain the testimony of others, com-
municating to the jury facts about petitioner's condition. Of course, all evidence received
in court is "testimonial" or "communicative" as these words are thus used. But the fifth
amendment relates only to acts on the part of the person to whom the privilege applies,
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ment by excluding from this rule lie detector tests which measure
changes in body functions during interrogation and which may be
directed to eliciting responses which are essentially testimonial. The
Court did not point out that the results of lie detector tests are usual-
ly inadmissible in court not on constitutional grounds but because of
the fallibility of the machine.'
In its exclusion of the blood test from the self-incrimination priv-
ilege, the Court further pointed out that the defendant's participation
was completely passive and indicated that because he did not have to
open his mouth during the whole process, the possibility of any testi-
mony was excluded. The Court conceded that the blood test is an in-
criminating product of compulsion"8 and that without the defend-
ant's participation, no matter how passive and silent, there would be
no positive proof of guilt. Should the defendant protest violently to
the taking of the blood sample, and the police use force reminiscent of
Rochin, the Court still maintained that the amount of force involved
would make no difference. In sum, the Court relied completely on the
idea of physical as opposed to testimonial evidence, essentially Wig-
more's theory, in deciding that the blood test was not within the self-
incrimination privilege.
The most difficult argument to answer was the question of the con-
stitutionality of the search and seizure. The Court in Breithaupt had
avoided the issue because the rule excluding evidence derived from an
unreasonable search and seizure was not, at the time, binding on the
states. 9 The Court in Scbmerber stated that with respect to intrusions
into the human body, it was writing on a clean slate;' therefore, cases
dealing with limitations on the kind of property which may or may
not be seized under warrant were of no help. The case law dealing with
procedures for search and seizure did, however, apply. Beginning with
the assumption that the self-incrimination clause did not bar intru-
sion into the body, the Court defined the proper function of the
fourth amendment: to constrain not against all intrusions, as such, but
against those made in an improper manner and those which were un-
justified or unreasonable. The issues in Schmerber were whether the
police were justified in taking the blood test without first obtaining a
search warrant and whether the procedures employed in taking the
and the Court used these words subject to the same limitation. The terms as the Court used
them do not apply to evidence of acts non-communicative in nature as to the person asserting
the privilege, even though, as here, such acts are compelled to obtain the testimony of others.
" 20 AM. JuR. EvIDENCE § 762 (1939). Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d 1306 (1952).
"SSchmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
" Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) was overruled by Mapp. v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
335 (1963).
40 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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blood were reasonable. To both issues the Court ruled affirmatively.
Although police generally are required to obtain search warrants from
judicial officers,' under exceptional circumstances they are relieved
of this duty." The officer was found to have had probable cause to
suspect that Schmerber was intoxicated as a result of observing him
at the scene of the accident and later at the hospital. In addition, the
Court recognized that the alcohol content in a person's body dimin-
ishes rapidly, and in order to ascertain as nearly as possible the amount
of alcohol in Schmerber's body at the time of the accident, the sample
had to be taken immediately."a The Court was satisfied that the pro-
cedures employed by the doctor in a sterile environment were reason-
able and the test itself was proper under the circumstances. Therefore,
the policeman had a right to order the test, and there was no unrea-
sonable search and seizure.
III. CONCLUSION
Although the Court completely refuted all of the constitutional ar-
guments asserted by the petitioner, there still remains the possibility
that the decision was based on policy considerations not elucidated in
the opinion. Coming on the heels of Miranda v. Arizona' the holding
in Schmerber may seem at first glance out of step with the Court's
protective attitude toward individual rights in cases involving crim-
inal prosecutions."' Of course, inherent in Schmerber is the underlying
consideration of carnage on our national highways resulting from
4t Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1947).
42 See notes 16 and 17 supra.
4aThe Court was told, "[T]he percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish
shortly after drinking stops, as the body functions to eliminate it from the system. Par-
ticularly in a case such as this, where time had to be taken to bring the accused to the
hospital and to investigate the scene of the accident, there was no time to seek out a magis-
trate and secure a warrant." 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966).
44384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda exemplifies the lengths to which the Court has been
willing to go to protect the accused from verbal incrimination. The case dealt specifically
with what is termed "custodial interrogation" by law enforcement officers. In Miranda,
however, there was no question concerning the use of the defendant's person or actions in
evidence against him. In reversing the conviction, the Court held that the prosecution may
not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interroga-
tion of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards to secure the
privilege against self-incrimination. The case is illustrative of the element of testimonial
compulsion, the lack of which in Schmerber contributed largely to the Court's holding.4 5 E.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (sixth amendment guarantee of right of
confrontation to accused made obligatory on the states through fourteenth amendment),
Note, 19 Sw. L.J. 632 (1965); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1963); Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (sixth amendment right to
counsel made obligatory on the states through the fourteenth amendment), Note, 18 Sw.
L.J. 284 (1964); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (eighth amendment prohibi-
tion of cruel and unusual punishment applied to states through fourteenth); Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (indigent's right to trial transcript free of charge for appeal
purposes secured).
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drunken driving and the deterrent effect of compelled blood tests,
matters dwelled on at length in Breithaupt. Moreover, through a blood
test, the proof of an individual's guilt or innocence can be determined
in a matter of minutes by a test which is clinically infallible."
Realizing the growing death rate on our national highways, many
state legislatures have passed statutes specifically dealing with the
problem of driving while intoxicated and the alcohol blood test."'
However, Texas still appears to give greater effect to the self-incrim-
ination privilege contained in its constitution than the United States
Supreme Court gives to the fifth amendment self-incrimination priv-
ilege. In answer to a query regarding the effect of Schmerber on the
present Texas law, Attorney General Waggoner Carr sent a Mem-
orandum to Department of Public Safety Director Homer Garrison
in which he stated that the Schmerber decision does not alter the fact
'Contrary to popular belief, the amount of alcohol consumed is not the only factor
in determining the degree of intoxication. Medical research shows that symptoms usually asso-
ciated with drunkenness are produced solely by alcohol reaching the brain's nerve centers.
This means, of course, that direct measurement of intoxication is impossible without an au-
topsy. But scientists have established (1) that the alcohol content of the brain is correlative
to the percentage of alcohol in the blood and (2) that the blood-alcohol ratio is reflected
in the blood, saliva, and breath. It is upon these experimentally proven theories that chemical
intoxication tests are based.
The validity of these tests is often questioned because of the aphorism that different per-
sons vary in their reaction to alcohol. However, this is explainable by the process of absorp-
tion. After alcohol is swallowed, it is absorbed slowly through the walls of the stomach and
small intestine and thence into the blood stream to be distributed throughout the body.
Some who can "hold" their liquor have a lower percentage of alcohol in their blood at any
given time because they either absorb the alcohol at a slower rate or eliminate it more quick-
ly than others do. Chemical intoxication tests make allowances for individual variations to
a large extent by measuring the alcoholic concentration of the blood, thereby indicating the
actual impairment of the imbiber's faculties whether subject is a heavy or moderate
drinker. 35 TEXAS L. REV. 813, 813-32 (1957). See also Ladd & Gibson, The Medico-Legal
Aspects of the Blood Test To Determine Intoxication, 29 VA. L. REV. 749 (1943); Leonard,
Test for Intoxication, 38 J. Culm. L., C.&P.S. 533 (1948); 2 SYRACUSE L. REV. 92
(1950); Comment, 51 MICH. L. REV. 72 (1952); Comment, 29 CONN. B.J. 147 (1955).
" Forty-seven states use chemical tests, including blood test, to aid in the determination
of intoxication in cases involving charges of driving while intoxicated. Twenty-three of
these states sanction the use of the test by statute. These, for the most part, have been pat-
terned after § 11-902 of the UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE prepared by the National Committee
on Uniform Laws and Ordinances. This section makes it unlawful to operate a motor ve-
hicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The finding of the presence of a cer-
tain percentage of alcohol by weight in the blood of a person gives rise to the presumption
that he was under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The twenty-three provisions include:
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 28, § 28-692 (1956); DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 11, § 3507
(1964); GA. CODE ANN., tit. 68, § 68-1625 (1957); IDAHO CODE, tit. 49, § 49-110.2
(1953); BURNS IND. STAT. ANN., tit. 47, § 47-2003 (1965); KAN. STAT. ANN., Ch. 8, §5
8-1001-07 (1955); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN., § 189.520 (1955); ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit.
29, § 1312 (1964); MINN. STAT. ANN., § 169.121 (1960); NEBR. REV. STAT., ch. 39, §§
39-727.01-.09 (1960); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 21, ch. 262-A:63 (1966); NJ. STAT.
ANN., tit. 39, § 39.4-50 (1961); McKINNEY's N.Y. LAWS, VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW,
art. 32, § 1194 (1960); N.D. CENTURY CODE ANN., ch. 39-20, § 39-20-01 (1961);
ORE. REV. STAT., tit. 39, § 483.634 (1965); S.C. CODE, tit. 46, § 46-344 (1962); S.D.
CODE, tit. 44, § 44.0302-1, 44.0302-2 (1960); TENN. COnE ANN., tit. 59, 55 59-1032,
59-1033 (1955); UTAH CODE ANN., tit. 41, 55 41-6-44, 41-6-44.10 (1960); VA. CODE
ANN., tit. 18.1, § 18.1-54-18.1-61 (1963); WASH. REV. CODE, tit. 46, § 46.56.010
(1962); WIs. STAT. ANN., tit. 30, § 325.235 (1958); WYo. STAT., tit. 31, § 31-129 (1957).
